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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Which issues presented in this appeal are live and which are moot? 
2. Were the Orders Denying Appellant's Motions properly denied as frivolous? 
3. Was Order Granting Attorney Fees and Cost property granted? 
4. Are there any new issues presented in this Appeal? 
5. Should attorney fees be awarded for the defense of this Appeal? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case began as a Civil Protection Order (CPO) case in Canyon County, Idaho, initiated 
by Plaintiff-Appellant RONALD L. VAN HOOK (hereinafter "Van Hook") on or around June 30, 
2014, Case Number CV-2014-6865-C. That case was followed shortly thereafter on July 15, 2014, 
by a filing by Van Hook of a Complaint for Custody, Visitation, and Support in Canyon County 
Case Number CV-2014-7409-C, which was changed to an Amended Complaint for a Decree of 
Legal Separation and for Custody of the Parties' Minor Children on July 18, 2014. That case was 
filed and heard under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) as the new IRFLP were not yet 
in effect in Canyon County. An Order for Publication was issued by the Magistrate Court, the 
Honorable Judge Gary D. DeMeyer, on July 21, 2014. Defendant-Respondent DAWN R. 
CANNON, formerly DAWN R. VAN HOOK, (hereinafter "Cannon"), was not a resident of 
Canyon County, a fact that was known to Van Hook, yet he requested to be allowed to publish his 
Summons' for service of the CPO as well as the Complaint for Legal Separation. Service by 
Publication in the Idaho Press Tribune was complete as of August 17, 2014, and an Order for 
Default was granted on September 11, 2014, based upon Van Hook's Motion for Default filed on 
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September 9, 2014. Cannon had filed for a CPO against Van Hook in Adams County, CV-2014-
3311, on September 4, 2014, alleging stalking, physical, mental, and emotional abuse, as well as 
a death threat. A Temporary Ex Parte CPO was issued in favor of Cannon that same day. When 
the hearing date for that CPO arrived, Cannon learned for the first time of the Default entered 
against her in Canyon County, and that a Decree had been entered in that case giving Van Hook 
sole legal and physical custody of the parties three (3) minor children. The Adams County CPO, 
which was ultimately granted in favor of Cannon against Van Hook for one (1) year, superseded 
the Canyon County Decree of Separation, and she retained primary custody of the children. 
Cannon obtained counsel, namely Mary R. Grant (hereinafter "Grant"), of Idaho Legal Aid 
Services, and a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure (IRCP) 
60(b)(l), (3), and (6) was filed on October 24, 2014. This motion was based upon the fact that Van 
Hook had knowledge of Cannon's county of residence on September 6, 2014, when he was served 
with the Adams County CPO, and yet he still filed a Motion for Default on September 9, 2014, 
claiming he had no knowledge of where she was, and that his service of her by publication was 
proper. The Decree for Legal Separation was set aside on November 19, 2014, and the case was 
converted to an action for Divorce shortly thereafter. Also on November 19, 2014, the Court issued 
an Order Setting Case and Scheduling Order, setting the case for Pre-Trial on March 4, 2015, as 
well as for a Court Trial on March 30, 2015. 
During both the CPO and the initial Divorce proceedings, Van Hook was represented by 
Steven Fisher, of Fisher Law Office, PLLC (hereinafter "Fisher"). A Motion and Affidavit for a 
Brief Focused Assessment (BF A) was filed by Cannon, and was granted by the Court on December 
2 
18, 2014. While there is no required completion date on the Order for Brief Focused Assessment, 
it generally takes ninety (90) to one hundred twenty (120) days for a BF A to be completed. 
Assuming that it might take the appointed assessor, Dr. Phares L. Book, PsyD (hereinafter 
"Book"), the maximum amount of time to complete, or perhaps even longer if either party did not 
cooperate fully with him during his custody evaluation, the Court, as well as both attorneys, felt 
that the Court trial set for March 30, 2015, needed to be vacated and reset. Trial was subsequently 
reset for two (2) days, August 5 and August 6, 2015, and amended one (1) week later to trial on 
August 3 and August 5, 2015. As Book began his evaluation, the parties' minor daughter, RLV 
(born in 2000), disclosed inappropriate sexual touching that she had been subjected to by Van 
Hook's close friend, Frank O'Leary (hereinafter "O'Leary"). Upon motion by Cannon, a 
Temporary Ex Parte Restraining Order (TRO) was put into effect by the Court on March 25, 2015, 
and an investigation by the Idaho Health and Welfare Department, Child Protection Services (CPS) 
was initiated. While Van Hook claimed to CPS that he would never allow O'Leary near his 
daughter, which resulted in CPS issuing an unsubstantiated report, he said separately to his 
daughter in a phone call that he did not believe anything she had said about O'Leary, and as soon 
as the CPS investigation was dropped, he would allow O'Leary unfettered access to her. Based 
upon this testimony via Affidavit by Cannon, the trial court kept the TRO in place for her safety. 
A Motion for Temporary Orders regarding custody and child support for the parties' minor 
children was filed by Cannon, with a supporting Affidavit, on March 23, 2015. It was submitted 
again on April 3, 2015, with an exhibit, namely child support worksheets. A Motion to Consolidate 
Cases was also filed by Cannon on April 2, 2015, proposing to consolidate the Adams County 
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CPO case with the Canyon County Divorce case. These motions were served on Fisher, who had 
filed his own Motion to for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel for Plaintiff, with a Supporting 
Declaration, on March 9, 2015. He stated in his declaration that there had been a breakdown in the 
professional relationship between himself and Van Hook, that Van Hook was not fulfilling his 
financial obligations, would not listen to or heed advice of counsel, and had indicated to Fisher 
that he felt he could better represent himself in this matter. Both Cannon's and Fisher's motions 
were set for the same day, April 16, 2015. 
As is standard procedure in Canyon County, Cannon's motions were heard first as once a 
an Order for Leave to Withdraw is granted under IRCP 1 l(b)(3), "no further proceedings can be 
had in that action which will affect the rights of the party of the withdrawing attorney for a period 
of20 days after service of that order." Had Fisher's Motion been heard and granted first, Cannon's 
motions would have not been heard for up to twenty (20) days. From the record, it appears that 
Fisher did not file any Response to Cannon's motions, but nonetheless, he was allowed by the 
Court of offer oral argument on behalf of Van Hook. Van Hook, however, was quite unhappy at 
this turn of events, and on numerous occasions, attempted to argue with the Court himself, though 
he was still represented by Counsel. It was after one of these outbursts that the Court threatened 
him with incarceration. All motions were granted except for Cannon's request for child support, 
and Fisher was relieved of his duties as Van Hook's attorney. 
IRCP ll(b)(3) states that if a party wishes to represent himself after his attorney has 
withdrawn, he shall file a written Notice of Appearance within a prescribed twenty (20) day period. 
Undoubtedly Van Hook wished to represent himself, but he did not file a Notice of Appearance 
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until May 22, 2015, which was outside of the twenty (20) day period. Cannon could have filed for 
Default because of this delay, but she did not. Van Hook had, however, filed an Objection to the 
Motion for Temporary Orders and an Objection to the Temporary TRO on April 7, 2015, while 
still represented by Counsel. He set a hearing on his Objections on April 27, 2015, before he had 
filed a Notice of Appearance, and in violation oflRCP 1 l(b)(3). Also on April 27, 2015, he filed 
his first Motion for Disqualification of Judge DeMeyer, citing IRCP 40( d)(l ), and set a hearing on 
that Motion, as well as on his Objections, on May 7, 2015. IRCP 40(d)(l) concerns the 
disqualification of a judge without cause, which can be filed no later than seven (7) days after 
service of a written notice or order setting the case for status conference, pre-trial, or trial, which 
in this case would have been November 26, 2014, over five ( 5) months prior to Van Hook's filing. 
Hearing was held on May 7, 2015, on Van Hook's Objection and Motion for 
Disqualification, but was reset to June 11, 2015 to give Van Hook time to file his written Notice 
of Appearance in the case. He did so on May 22, 2015, and filed another Motion for 
Disqualification, again citing IRCP 40( d)(l ). He also re-filed his Objection to the Temporary TRO, 
a Motion to Amend the Consolidation of Cases, and a Motion to Amend Temporary Orders for 
Custody and Visitation that had just been granted. On May 28, 2015, he filed a Motion and 
Supporting Affidavit for Criminal Contempt against Cannon, a Notice of Sanctions, and a Notice 
of Arraignment, setting all filings for the June 11, 2015, hearing date. IRCP 7(b)(3)(A) requires 
fourteen (14) days notice of the hearing, and IRCP 6(e)(l) requires three (3) additional days to be 
added onto the prescribed time when service is completed by mail. This would require Cannon to 
receive seventeen (17) notice of the hearing, and yet she only received fourteen (14). Nonetheless, 
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hearing was held on June 11, 2015, on Van Hook's Motions and Objections. Cannon's counsel 
noted the shortened time for the Court, but agreed to go forward, which the Court allowed, 
presumably as an accommodation to Van Hook as a pro se litigant not having a complete 
knowledge of the Court's rules. At that hearing, his motions were denied: his Motion for 
Disqualification was filed under the wrong rule; his attempt at Contempt was neither personally 
served on Cannon, nor in the proper form for a contempt action under IRCP 75; and as he had been 
represented by counsel at the original Temporary Order hearing at which time the Court put into 
place the status quo custody arrangement that had been put into place by the Adams County Court 
in the CPO hearing, the Court, in its discretion, chose not to disturb its earlier order. 
Next, Van Hook filed an Amended Complaint for Legal Separation, as well as Another 
Summons on July 6, 2015, one (1) month before trial, but as he had not asked for leave of the 
Court to do so as prescribed in IRCP 15(a), it was never considered by the Court. He also served 
Interrogatories, Requests for Production, and Requests for Admission on Cannon on July 6, 2015, 
via mail, but as the Court's Scheduling Order, Paragraph 2, stated that all discovery was to be 
completed not less than fifteen (15) days prior to the pre-trial conference, set for July 20, 2015, 
Cannon would not have been given the required thirty (30) days to complete the Interrogatories, 
the Requests for Production, nor the Requests for Admission, plus three (3) days allowed due to 
the service being by mail, as allowed under IRCP 33(a), 34(b), and 36(a). Therefore, the discovery 
requests were not completed. 
Subsequently, Van Hook filed a Motion for a Guardian ad Litem (GAL) on July 7, 2015, 
set a hearing for his Motion on July 16, 2015, nine (9) days later, and mailed both the Motion and 
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the Notice of Hearing to Cannon. Again, though he had not given Cannon the proper notice of the 
hearing, her counsel offered no objection to having the hearing, though she noted it for the record. 
In violation of IRCP 7 (b )(1 ), no applicable rule was cited in support of this motion. This hearing 
was held less than three (3) weeks before trial, and if granted, would have necessitated another 
lengthy delay in the already long case, and was denied. The motion was given consideration by 
the Court, and in an effort to protect whomever the GAL would be, the Court, in its discretion, 
required a twenty thousand dollar ($20,000.00) cash deposit to be put down with the Court before 
appointing someone. When Van Hook refused, the motion was denied. Van Hook had also brought 
a Proposed Order for both parties to take a polygraph test, but it was not considered by the Court 
as it had not been set for hearing by way of a motion and supporting affidavit in accordance with 
IRCP 7. 
Lastly prior to trial, Van Hook filed a Pre-Trial Memorandum on July 6, 2015, that 
contained a list of his proposed witnesses and exhibits. He filed a Witness and Exhibit List on July 
30, 2015. The Court's Amended Order Setting Case and Scheduling Order required that at least 
ten (10) days before trial, each party would serve on the other a list of witnesses and exhibits. 
Cannon's was filed on July 24, 2015, and listed only the parties as witnesses, while Van Hook's 
listed the nine (9) in his Pre-Trial Memorandum, and an additional four ( 4) new witnesses. 
Trial was held on August 3, 2015, at which time Van Hook continued to represent himself. 
Cannon's counsel, now Kimberli A. Stretch, also of Idaho Legal Aid Services (hereinafter 
"Stretch"), objected to the four (4) new witnesses on Van Hook's July 30, 2015 Witness List for 
not being disclosed in a timely manner. The objection was sustained, and those four (4) persons 
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were to be prohibited from testifying. The completed BF A report had been filed with the Court on 
June 8, 2015, and it was recommended by Dr. Book that Cannon retain full custody of the children, 
subject to visitation by Van Hook. Since the report was admitted into evidence, Cannon only 
needed to testify as to her employment and current wage, and then rested on the results of the BF A. 
Van Hook, having the burden to prove that the conclusions in BFA were incorrect, took no steps 
to do so. He called no expert witnesses to refute Book's report. He didn't call Book himself to 
discuss anything about the report. He came to trial unprepared, without all of his evidence, and 
when he was given the opportunity to refute Cannon's testimony, he stated that he did not have all 
of the evidence he needed, but would bring it the next day for trial. As it was barely 3:00 p.m., the 
Court, in its discretion, informed Van Hook that if he did not have the proper evidence with him 
then, he would not be able to present it as the day set for trial was today, and he was expected to 
be fully prepared. Because he had nothing else to present, the trial concluded. 
The Court set a special setting for August 27, 2015, at which time the Judge issued his 
ruling. Magistrate Judge DeMeyer granted Cannon sole legal and physical custody of the children 
based upon the BF A submitted by the Court's expert, Dr. Book, as well as testimony and evidence 
given at trial. Van Hook was granted custodial time with the children, but to be exercised at the 
children's discretion. Again, this ruling was well within the Court's discretion, and based upon 
both the BF A and evidence and testimony offered at trial. Stretch was ordered to draft the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce, and to submit it to the Court, which she did. Said Judgment was 
filed in this case on September 9, 2015. 
Rather than begin to work on the personal issues that cost Van Hook custody of his 
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children, he chose to get a new attorney, Virginia Bond, of Bond Law, Chartered (hereinafter 
"Bond"), and file a Motion for Reconsideration under Idaho Rule of Family Law Procedure 
(IRFLP) 503(B), as well as a Motion for aNewTrial under IRFLP 807(A), on September 23, 2015. 
Neither motion cited the proper IRCP under which this case was heard and decided. Nor did he 
file a Notice of Appeal, which needed to be filed by October 21, 2015. Cannon lodged objections 
to both motions. Before the scheduled January 14, 2016 hearing was held on the motions, they 
were withdrawn byVanHookonDecember22, 2015. On December 30, 2015, a Motion to Change 
Venue with a supporting Affidavit of Van Hook was filed, with hearing set for January 28, 2016. 
The hearing was held on January 28, 2016, at which time the Court denied the Motion, choosing 
to retain jurisdiction over the case. By this time, the time to appeal the Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce had long since run, the deadline being over three (3) months prior. The case remained 
inactive until Van Hook's new counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw, citing what she felt were vague 
threats to her reputation. Cannon offered no objection to the withdrawal of Bond, and it was 
granted on March 17, 2016. With nothing pending before the Court, Van Hook again filed a Notice 
of Appearance, as well as a Motion to Recuse Judge DeMeyer With Cause on April 1, 2016. By 
this time, the time for Van Hook to File a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment under IRCP 60(b) 
had also lapsed, having been needed to be filed not more than six (6) months after the judgment, 
which would have been March 9, 2016. Having missed all deadlines to file anything to challenge 
the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, Van Hook chose again to attack the Court for its supposed 
bias. Cannon properly filed an objection, and after oral argument was heard, Van Hook's motion 
was denied on the grounds it was frivolous, and attorney fees and costs were granted in accordance 
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withIRCP 54(d)(l) and 54(e)(l). A Memorandum of Cost and Fees was filed under IRCP 54(d)(5), 
and with no Objection having been filed by Van Hook under IRCP 54(d)(6), attorney fees and 
costs were granted. 
Van Hook chose not to file a Motion for Reconsideration, but rather lodged an Appeal on 
the Order Denying his Motion to Recuse Judge DeMeyer, claiming bias against him by the judge, 
as well as other nefarious actions having been perpetrated against him by the judge, both opposing 
counsels, and by his own former two (2) attorneys. Oral Argument was set on the appeal on 
October 11, 2016. Extensive argument by Van Hook was permitted by the Honorable Judge D. 
Duff McKee, in an effort to allow Van Hook to lay a foundation for his claims. Ultimately, Van 
Hook's appeal was found to be frivolous and meritless, was denied, and attorney fees were 
awarded. A Memorandum Decision on Appeal was entered in favor of Cannon on October 18, 
2016. 
While Van Hook was pursuing his first Appeal, he initiated a new case against Cannon, 
Canyon County Case Number CV-2016-5044-C, Motion for Writ(s) of Habeas Corpus and Motion 
for Writ(s) of Mandamus, which appeared to request that the District Court immediately order 
Cannon to give the parties' children to him, and to punish Magistrate Judge DeMeyer for his 
perceived bias against Van Hook. He did not serve Cannon with the Motion. On the day of the oral 
argument, Van Hook informed Stretch that he was no longer suing Cannon with the Writs, but had 
amended his pleading to name Stretch as the Defendant. He never properly served her with the 
Motion. He did, however, have the Court issue six (6) Summons in the case for the following 
parties: Cannon, Stretch, Grant, Fisher, Bond, and Judge Gary D. DeMeyer (hereinafter 
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"DeMeyer"). Those Summons were never served on anyone, nor was the Motion ever amended 
properly to add the additional five (5) parties. The Motion for Writ of Mandamus was dismissed 
as improper on December 16, 2016. The Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus was allowed to be 
transferred to Adams County. Stretch signed on to the case for Cannon, and received a copy of the 
case file from the Adams County Clerk. Briefs were submitted by both Cannon and Van Hook. 
The Court issued its ruling dismissing Van Hook's Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus as, per 
statute, he is specifically barred from getting the relief he sought. Cannon submitted a Motion for 
Attorney Fees and Costs. Van Hook issued no objection. A hearing on that Motion is set for 
October 20, 2017. 
After losing his first appeal, Van Hook filed four ( 4) new motions: 1) Motion for Order 
Finding Defendant in Criminal Contempt and Notice, with a Supporting Affidavit and Notice of 
Sanctions; 2) Motion for Change of and/or New Orders with a Supporting Affidavit; 3) Motion to 
Change Venue with a Supporting Affidavit; and 4) Motion to Disqualify Judge with Cause, with 
Supporting Affidavit. He set a hearing on all four ( 4) motions for November 3, 2016. On the day 
of hearing, Judge DeMeyer was unavailable, and the presiding judge was the Honorable Judge 
Howard Smyser. Judge Smyser stated that he did not feel he could properly decide any of the 
motions because of the complexity of the case, and instructed Van Hook to reset his hearing for a 
time after Judge DeMeyer returned. This upset Van Hook greatly, and led him to file a Motion for 
Reconsideration, with a supporting affidavit. A hearing on all five (5) motions was set for 
December 8, 2016. 
Prior to that December 8, 2016 hearing, on December 1, 2016, Van Hook initiated another 
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case by filing a Civil Complaint for Damages Motion for Writ of Mandamus, as well as a 
Summons, in Canyon County Case Number CV-2016-11807-C. In this new case, Van Hook sued 
Cannon, Stretch, DeMeyer, Grant, Fisher, and Bond for Thirty-Five Million Dollars 
($35,000,000.00) for damages sustained from loss of consortium, emotional distress, actual costs, 
and lost wages. He also claimed punitive damages, but did not demand a specific amount. In this 
Complaint, he accused all six ( 6) of the Defendants of making false allegations about him, which 
defamed him; breach contractual duties withJ)iim; failing to comply with the Idaho Rules of 
Professional Conduct and/or the Idaho Code of Judicial Conduct; and violating and/or conspiring 
to violate his civil rights. Stretch, Cannon, Grant, and DeMeyer were served. A hearing on Stretch, 
Cannon, and Grant's Motion to Dismiss, as well as DeMeyer's Motion to Dismiss was held on 
February 16, 2017, in front of the Honorable Judge Christopher S. Nye. All were granted, with the 
exception of one charge against Cannon for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress still 
pending. Fisher and Bond also filed Motions to Dismiss, and theirs were granted as well. 
In this case, CV-2014-7409-C, on December 8, 2016, the hearing on Van Hook's five (5) 
motions was held. Cannon had filed a blanket o~jection to all motions as frivolous, meritless, and 
baseless, and requested attorney fees. At the hearing, Van Hook demanded that DeMeyer recuse 
himself right then, and pass the motions to someone else. DeMeyer denied that Motion, as well as 
the other four ( 4 ), as frivolous, and awarded attorney fees to Cannon. This appeal stems from the 
denial of those five motions. 
Lastly, on behalf of Cannon, Stretch filed a Motion to Declare Van Hook a Vexatious 
Litigant with a supporting affidavit, on January 27, 2017. A hearing was held before 
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Administrative District Judge Bradly S. Ford on the Motion on February 14, 2017. A new case 
was started by the Court for this particular action, Canyon County CV-2017-3444-C. An Order for 
Referral to Administrative Judge Re: Vexatious Litigation was entered on April 27, 2017. After 
the formal Order was entered, a Proposed Prefiling Order Declaring Vexatious Litigant Pursuant 
to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59 was issued by the Court. Van Hook filed a Jurisdictional 
Challenge - Response to Proposed Prefiling Order Declaring Vexatious Litigant Pursuant to Idaho 
Court Administrative Rule 59-Request for Judicial Notice of Cases with Same or Similar Subject 
Matter on June 9, 2017, which led to a hearing before Judge Ford on August 31, 2017 on Van 
Hook's objection. Oral argument was given by Van Hook and Stretch, which led to a final Prefiling 
Order Declaring Vexatious Litigant Pursuant to Idaho Court Administrative Rule 59 being issued 
by Judge Ford on September 20, 2017. Van Hook filed an Appeal on that decision on or around 
October 2, 2017. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for a denial of Motions for Change of and/or New Orders, 
Disqualification, Change of Venue, Contempt, and Reconsideration is an abuse of discretion 
standard. Whether a judge's involvement in a case reaches the point where disqualification from 
further participation in a defendant's case becomes necessary is left to the sound discretion of the 
judge himself. Sivak v. State of Idaho, 112 Idaho 197, 206 (Idaho 1986). A court's rulings will 
not be disturbed unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion. Navo v. Bingham Memorial 
Hosp., 160 Idaho 363, 370 (Idaho 2016). To determine whether there has been an abuse of 
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discretion, the Court will ask three (3) questions: 1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the 
issue as one of discretion; 2) whether the court acted within the boundaries of such discretion 
consistently and with legal standards; and 3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise 
of reason. McDaniel v. Inland Northwest Renal Group-Idaho, LLC, 144 Idaho 219, 222 (Idaho 
2007). 
The standard of review for an award of attorney fees and costs is an abuse of discretion 
standard. Sun Valley Shopping Center, Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94 (Idaho 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
Ronald L. Van Hook's appeal on his Motions for Change of and/or New Orders, Change 
of Venue, Disqualification with Cause, and Reconsideration must be denied because they were all 
properly dismissed by the Magistrate Judge as frivolous and without merit. The appeal on the 
Motion for Order Finding Defendant in Criminal Contempt must be denied because it was not 
brought in accordance with IRCP 75, and is moot because Cannon cannot violate the clauses in 
the Judgment as he claims. 
As stated in the previous appeal, this case has been a long, contentious one, and has only 
grown longer and more contentious. Throughout the course of proceedings that began in the 
summer of 2014, Van Hook has learned from his many and varied mistakes. With every Response 
or Objection filed to his various frivolous motions, he learned a little bit more about what not to 
do next time. As is frequently said, a little knowledge can be dangerous, and it certainly is in Van 
Hook's case. He uses any newfound legal knowledge to file additional motions or complaints, but 
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none cure the underlying problem that he has: he had the proper legal remedy to his dissatisfaction 
with the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, entered on September 9, 2015, namely appeal, and he 
chose not to use it. Everything filed since October 21, 2015, the final day he had to file an Appeal, 
is an attempt to do what is described in In the Matter of the Estate of Bagley, "as an end-run around 
the time limits ofl.A.R. [Idaho Appellate Rule] 14." 117 Idaho 1091, 1093 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990). 
Van Hook begins his argument by citing various Federal cases that he believes are 
controlling authority concerning the filings of pro se litigants. He interprets them to mean that 
regardless of what he files, or in what format, the Court should accept it and never question it. This 
interpretation is incorrect. Van Hook's pleadings frequently do fail to cite proper legal authority, 
confuse legal theories, contain poor syntax and sentence construction, and are unfamiliar with the 
rule requirement, as he details on page 13 of his Brief. But that has not stopped the Appellate 
Court, the District Court, or the Magistrate Court from allowing him to have his say, or make his 
argument. The Idaho Courts have been exceedingly kind and fair to Van Hook, though he fails to 
recognize it. As stated in the previous Appeal, it is a well-established principle that prose litigants 
are held to the same legal standards as attorneys, and are not entitled to special consideration or 
leniency. Pro se litigants must follow the same rules of procedure as attorneys. Golay v. Loomis, 
118 Idaho 387,392 (Idaho 1990); Bettweiser v. NY Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317,322 (Idaho 
2013), ( citing Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 229 (Idaho 2009); Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 
709 (Idaho 2005); Twin Falls Cnty. v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445 (Idaho 2003)). In citing this new 
Federal authority, Van Hook seems to seek to overturn years of Idaho precedent. Taken to its 
logical conclusion, were his interpretation be given preeminence, the entire body of Idaho law 
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would be in jeopardy. A prose litigant would only need to say, "I don't understand," and then 
nothing they ever did could be construed as incorrect, improper, or frivolous. Idaho Statutes and 
Rules apply to all persons who appear in its Courts, not just the ones who are legally trained. 
Van Hook's ultimate goal since early 2015, before the parties' divorce was ever finalized, 
has been to force Magistrate Judge Gary D. DeMeyer off of this case, and the white-hot fury that 
fuels that goal has not abated. The previous appeal in this case concerned a Motion for Recusal 
with Cause filed by Van Hook against Judge DeMeyer. It was dismissed as frivolous because there 
was no pending proceeding that was before the Judge from which he could recuse himself. The 
District Court acting in its Appellate capacity also made it clear to Van Hook that in order for it to 
find bias against him by the Judge, it had to come from outside the case, not from rulings that were 
adverse to him. Van Hook learned from this, as he so frequently does. He filed Motions for Writs 
of Mandamus and Habeas Corpus, and attempted to name the Judge as a party, thereby creating 
an outside bias. But he failed in that. He then filed the motions upon which this appeal is based, 
frivolous all of them, but they were motions in front of the Magistrate Judge, ones that Judge 
DeMeyer could recuse himself from, ifhe chose to do so. Lastly, Van Hook then initiated a Civil 
Complaint for Damages in the amount of thirty-five million dollars ($35,000.000.00), and named 
not only the judge, but his ex-wife, the former Idaho Legal Aid attorney who represented her, her 
current Legal Aid attorney, and his two (2) former attorneys. In doing this, he believed that he now 
has created his outside bias. This maneuver is a blatant attempt to manipulate the legal system, it 
not allowed pursuant to Idaho case law, and cannot be allowed to stand. For these reasons, this 
Appeal must be denied as moot and frivolous, and attorney fees should be awarded. 
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I. THERE ARE TWO LIVE ISSUES RIPE FOR APPEAL 
This Court may only address issues that are not moot, and may dismiss an appeal when it 
appears that the case only involves a moot issue. Downing v. Jacobs, 99 Idaho 127, 127-28 (Idaho 
1978). A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a 
legally cognizable interest in the outcome. Goodson v. Nez Perce Bd. Of Cnty Com 'rs, 113 Idaho 
851, 853 (Idaho 1999). A case is moot if it presents no justiciable controversy and a judicial 
determination will have no practical effect upon the outcome. Id. There are three (3) exceptions to 
the mootness doctrine: 1) when there is the possibility of collateral legal consequences imposed 
on the person raising the issue; 2) when the challenged conduct is likely to evade judicial review 
and thus is capable of repetition; and 3) when an otherwise moot issue raises concerns of 
substantial public interest. Ameritel Inns, Inc. v Greater Boise Auditorium Dist., 141 Idaho 849, 
851-52 (Idaho 2005). 
In this case, the Judgment and Decree of Divorce was entered on September 9, 2015, and 
an appeal had to be filed by October 21, 2015. Van Hook did not file such an appeal. He could 
have filed a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment under IRCP 60(b ), but needed to have done so by 
March 9, 2016. He did not file such a motion. With his options exhausted, this case should have 
been closed. But Van Hook chose to mount a collateral attack on the Judgment in the form of a 
Motion for Recusal of Judge DeMeyer With Cause. When that was denied, and the Appeal that he 
filed was denied as well, he mounted a second collateral attack by filing five (5) additional motions, 
all of which were denied as frivolous. 
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Though it is not explicitly clear from Van Hook's Motion for Change Of and/or New 
Orders which specific section of IRCP 60 upon which he is basing his motion, it can be assumed 
that is it 60(b)(6) as 60(b)(l) through 60(b)(5) do not apply. Those sections are either past the time 
by which they needed to be filed (IRCP 60(b)(l)-(3)), or Van Hook has never made the claim that 
they apply (IRCP 60(b)(4)-(5)). Regardless, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure do not govern the 
proceedings, so Van Hook failed to state a valid rule upon which relief could be granted to him. 
However, Cannon did not file her objection to Van Hook's motion on that basis, but on its lack of 
merit. 
Van Hook augmented the record for this Appeal, and added six (6) Civil Protection Order 
cases in Canyon County from 2014; one (1) Ex Parte Restraining Order in Owyhee County from 
2015; three (3) civil cases in Canyon County from 2016: Small Claims, Writ(s) of Mandamus and 
Habeas Corpus, and a Civil Complaint for Damages; and two (2) civil cases in 2017, one (1) in 
Adams County, which is the Habeas Corpus matter transferred from Canyon County, and one (1) 
for Vexatious Litigant in Canyon County. Augmenting the record is permitted under Idaho 
Appellate Rule 30, but the function of augmenting the record with additional cases is allow the 
Appellate Court to get a fuller appreciation of the case at hand. It is not a tool to re-open and re-
litigate all cases that are included in an augmentation. Consequently, though this Appeal has been 
augmented by twelve (12) additional cases, they do not present any additional appealable issues. 
II. APPELLANT'S MOTIONS WERE PROPERLY DENIED 
A. Van Hook's Motion for Change Of and/or New Orders was properly denied as 
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frivolous. 
This case is a family law proceeding, which is governed by the Idaho Rules of Family Law 
Procedure. As such, Van Hook should not have cited IRCP 60, but rather IRFLP 809, which 
governs the grounds for relief from Judgment or Order due to Mistake, Inadvertence, Excusable 
Neglect, Newly Discovered Evidence, Fraud, and three (3) additional grounds. The first three (3) 
grounds, IRFLP 809(1)-(3) must be brought no more than six (6) months after Judgment is entered, 
so Van Hook cannot claim relief due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect, newly 
discovered evidence, or fraud. Van Hook did not, nor has he ever, claimed the Judgment is void, 
so IRFLP 809(4) does not apply. IRFLP 809(5) regards a judgment that has been satisfied, which 
is inapplicable in this situation that concerns child custody, so that cannot be the ground he claims. 
That only leaves IRFLP 809(6): Any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment. There is no time limit prescribed to this ground beyond the admonition that it "shall be 
made within a reasonable time." As the IRFLP were adopted July 1, 2015, and are still fairly new, 
case law citing IRCP 60(b)(6) must be used to discover the Court's treatment of this rule. 
A party may attempt to obtain relief from a final judgment by making a motion to the trial 
court, rather than filing an appeal, under IRCP 60(b ). "Such a motion should not be used, however, 
as a substitute for a timely appeal." Miller v. Haller, 129 Idaho 345, 248 (Idaho 1996) (citing 
Johnston v. Pasco, 100 Idaho 414,420 (Idaho 1979)). Because of there is the option of an appeal, 
the trial court's discretion in granting a motion under IRCP 60(b )( 6) is limited and may be granted 
only on a showing of "unique and compelling circumstances." Bagley, at 1093. The trial court 
must make their determination about whether to grant relief by recognizing that the decision is one 
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of their discretion, by acting within the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistent with 
applicable legal standards, and ultimately, it must reach its decision by an exercise of reason. Sun 
Valley Shopping Ctr., at 94 (Idaho 1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598,600 (Idaho 1989)). 
The unique and compelling standard under Bagley is a high bar to clear. It states that the 
motion cannot be disguised as a substitute for a timely appeal. Bagley at 1094. The Idaho Supreme 
Court inPrintcraft Press, Inc. v. Sunnyside Park Utilities, Inc., 153 Idaho 440,450 (Idaho 2012), 
acknowledges that it only applies IRCP 60(b )(6) sparingly, and cites a mere six (6) cases in which 
they have considered or applied the rule. They state that it applies only to define the outer bounds 
of the trial comi' s discretion. Id. As a result, there are few examples of it being used successfully, 
and that outer boundary of the trial court's discretion is not clear. In Printcraft, the Court denies 
relief from judgment because the trial court applied the wrong standard. Eby v. State, 148 Idaho 
731, 736-737 (Idaho 2010), applied IRCP 60(b)(6) to provide post-conviction relief to a party who 
received ineffective assistance of counsel. In giving their ruling, the Supreme Court makes it clear 
that their decision may only apply to post-conviction relief, rather than all civil cases. Lastly, in 
Bergv. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571 (Idaho 2009), the Supreme Court grants relief under IRCP 60(b)(6) 
to a child who suffered an injury after a car accident because her father neglected to continue to 
prosecute her case. Through no fault of her own, her case was dismissed, which provided the 
unique and compelling circumstances that the Court looks for when it provides relief from 
judgment. 
Van Hook's situation does not rise to that level. When the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
was entered on September 9, 2015, Van Hook's remedy was an appeal. He chose not to pursue 
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that avenue. He cannot claim that he did not know of the option, as he had hired attorney Virginia 
Bond to represent him prior to the forty-two (42) day time limit under IAR 14. It is unknown to 
Cannon why Van Hook did not pursue this option. Once that deadline passed, he could have 
attempted to file for relief from judgment under IRCP 60 to conect what he felt were deficiencies 
in the judgment. He did not do that, either. Instead, he chose to file frivolous motions on two (2) 
separate occasions, followed by two (2) appeals. His Motion for a Change Of and/or New Orders 
does not rise to the level of a unique and compelling circumstance that demands the Court provide 
relief because he can find relief elsewhere. Nor was Van Hook' s Motion filed in anything that 
could be construed as "a reasonable amount of time." As has been pointed out to him repeatedly, 
Van Hook can work towards the relief he wants by changing his behavior, becoming the father his 
children want to have, and when he does that, they'll want to exercise visitation with him. But to 
reward Van Hook's frivolous, meritless filings and behavior by allowing him to modify the 
custody anangement established by the trial court without a proper filing under IRFLP, and all 
that entails would truly be an injustice. 
B. Van Hook's Motion for Change of Venue was properly denied as frivolous. 
IRFLP 105 controls any procedure to change venue, and it lays out a number of reasons 
venuelWi'tYbe changed (emphasis mine). Only one prong is necessary to change venue. First, the 
rule states that a change of venue may be granted when it appears that the county designated in the 
Petition is not the proper county. IRFLP 105.A.l. The second reason venue may be changed is if 
an impartial trial cannot be had in that county. IRFLP 105.A.2. Lastly, if the convenience of the 
witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. IRFLP 105 .A.3. Van Hook 
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chose Canyon County initially as the county in which he wished to file this proceeding, not 
Cannon. As the Defendant in the case, she could have requested a change in venue to one more 
convenient to her, but she chose not to contest Van Hook's chosen county. On the surface of it, it 
may seem more convenient to all parties if venue were changed. But the entire rule is a "MAY," 
not a "MUST." A judge can choose to retain jurisdiction of a case when he or she feels that the 
"ends of justice" will be best served by keeping the case in that county. As has been repeatedly 
stated, this is a long and involved case, and it is reasonable to presume that Judge DeMeyer chose 
not to grant Van Hook's Motion to Change Venue because he felt that, because he knows this case 
intimately, the children's interests would be best served by the case being retained in Canyon 
County. 
By the three (3) prongs of abuse of discretion, the Magistrate Court did not abuse its 
discretion when it chose not to change venue per Van Hook's request. As IRFLP 105 clearly says 
venue MAY be changed, not MUST be changed, Judge DeMeyer rightly perceived the issue was 
one of discretion. He acted within the boundaries of such discretion consistently and with legal 
standards as he was not required to change venue. Lastly, from all appearances, Judge DeMeyer 
reached his decision by an exercise of reason, believing that it was in the children's best interest 
to maintain jurisdiction over the case in Canyon County. 
C. Van Hook's Motion for Disqualification of Judge with Cause was properly denied as 
frivolous. 
The issue of Judge DeMeyer being recused with Cause is the driving force of every 
pleading Van Hook has filed in this case since the entry of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
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was entered on September 9, 2015. It was the focus of his first appeal, which he lost because he 
could show no bias against him by Judge DeMeyer. It was exhaustively explained to him by Judge 
McKee, both during oral argument as well as in his Memorandum Decision on Appeal, that bias 
must come from outside of the case, not from adverse rulings. Taking that to heart, Van Hook tried 
again by filing a Civil Complaint for Damages against six (6) parties, including Judge DeMeyer, 
which he believed established an outside bias, after he'd filed another Motion for Recusal under 
IRFLP 108. He argues that this lawsuit, plus the entirety of the proceedings in this case, and every 
one he has augmented this appeal with, show bias against him by Judge DeMeyer, and states the 
judge must recuse himself. However, that it incorrect. 
Whether a judge's involvement in a case reaches the point where disqualification from 
further participation in a defendant's case becomes necessary is left to the sound discretion of the 
judge himself. Sivak, 112 Idaho at 206. "[S]uspicion, surmise, speculation, rationalization, 
conjecture, innuendo, and statements of mere conclusions ... may not be substituted for a statement 
of facts." DesFosses v. DesFosses, 122 Idaho 634, 636 (Idaho 1992) (citing DesFosses v. 
DesFosses, 120 Idaho 27 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)). Adverse rulings alone do not support the 
existence of a disqualifying prejudice. Bell v. Bell, 122 Idaho 520, 530 (Idaho Ct. App. 1992) (also 
citing DesFosses v. DesFosses, 120 Idaho 27 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)). Van Hook has offered no 
evidence that Judge DeMeyer is a party to this case, or has a personal interest in this case in any 
way, so he cannot be disqualified for that. He appears to feel that the judge is biased based upon 
rulings against him that occurred in the normal course of the proceedings. For those rulings to be 
disqualifying, they "must stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits 
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on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case." Desfosses, 122 
Idaho at 29. There is no evidence presented by Van Hook to indicate that this is the case. 
Concerning Van Hook's allegation that there is an outside bias created by the very fact that 
he sued the judge, he is also incorrect. He cannot orchestrate the removal of the Judge simply by 
initiating a lawsuit against him. Judge DeMeyer could have recused himself for that reason, but 
the decision is still left to his sound discretion, and he chose to remain on the case. "The mere 
filing of a suit against a judge is not conclusive as to bias or other grounds mandating 
disqualification." Eismann v. Miller, 101 Idaho 692, n.4 (Idaho 1980). Courts cannot allow the 
filing of a pleading to initiate a lawsuit against a judge simply for the purpose of forcing his recusal 
or else the judicial process would be hopelessly obstructed. Id. For this reason, Judge DeMeyer 
did not abuse his discretion to not recuse himself, and in denying Van Hook's Motion to Disqualify 
the judge. 
D. Van Hook's Motion for Reconsideration was properly denied as frivolous. 
It was only because Judge DeMeyer was unavailable that a different judge appeared in the 
case as a replacement on the day of Van Hook's hearing. It is customary for a fill-in judge to not 
issue a ruling in a case that is too complex for him to get a handle on. This was the situation for 
Judge Smyser. He evaluated the extensive case file for this case, stated that he had spent at least 
thirty (30) minutes reviewing it and still could not get a feel for it, and so decided to reset the 
hearing for when Judge DeMeyer returned. Van Hook's Motion for Reconsideration seems to ask 
the Court to go back in time, and for Judge Smyser to change his mind and hear the Motions. But 
Judge Smyser is the not the Judge assigned to the case, and he has no power to take the case away 
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from Judge DeMeyer, and rule in Van Hook's favor. Van Hook's Motion for Reconsideration, by 
its very nature, cannot be granted, and therefore, was denied as moot. That decision should not be 
disturbed here. 
E. Van Hook's Motion for Order Finding Defendant in Criminal Contempt and Notice 
was properly denied as frivolous. 
As stated previously, this case is a family law proceeding, which is governed by the Idaho 
Rules of Family Law Procedure. IRFLP 822 regarding contempt simply says, "Actions for 
contempt shall be governed by Rule 75, Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." Van Hook's action for 
contempt against Cannon is anonsummary proceeding in accordance with IRCP 75(a)(5), meaning 
that Cannon was given prior notice of the charge of contempt and an opportunity for a hearing. 
IRCP 75( c )(3) states: "Factual Allegations. The written charge of contempt or affidavit must allege 
the specific facts constituting the alleged contempt and set forth each instance of alleged contempt 
separately. The written charge or affidavit need not allege facts showing that the respondent's 
failure to comply with the court order was willful. If the alleged contempt is the violation of a court 
order, the written charge or affidavit must also allege that either respondent or the respondent's 
attorney was served with a copy of the court order or had actual knowledge of it." In accordance 
with this rule, Idaho's Supreme Court has stated that an alleged contemnor is entitled to certain 
procedural due process protections, including "notice of the exact charges against him." Carr v. 
Pridgen, 157 Idaho 238, 243 (Idaho 2014) (citing Ross v. Coleman Co., Inc., 114 Idaho 817, 838 
(Idaho 1988)). "Before someone can be found in contempt for violating a court order, the order 
must command that person to do or to refrain from doing something." Bald, Fat, & Ugly, LLC v. 
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Keane, 154 Idaho 807,810 (Idaho 2013) (citingBandelin v. Quinlan, 94 Idaho 858 (Idaho 1972)). 
"To find a person in criminal contempt for willfully disobeying a court order, the order must be 
clear and unequivocal." State v. Rice, 145 Idaho 554, 556 (Idaho 2008). Two issues arise for Van 
Hook: his Motion does not include the exact charges against Cannon, and the Judgment does not 
command Cannon to do or to refrain from doing anything. 
Van Hook's Motion for Order Finding Defendant in Criminal Contempt lists two (2) counts 
against Cannon: 1) "On multiple occasions and/or for Multiple Counts, Defendant has willfully 
failed to allow and/or prevented visitation of the Plaintiff with the parties [sic] minor children as 
specifically ordered in Paragraph 4 of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce of Sept. 09, 2015, and 
as ordered orally Aug. 27, 2015," and 2) "On multiple occasions and/or for Multiple Counts, 
Defendant has willfully failed to allow and/or prevented electronic or telephone communication 
of the Plaintiff with the parties [sic] minor children as specifically ordered in Paragraph 4 of the 
Judgment and Decree of Divorce or Sept. 09, 2015, and ordered orally Aug. 27, 2015." There is 
no specificity as to what these multiple occasions are. However, Van Hook attempted to cure this 
defect with additional details in his supporting Affidavit. First, he accuses Cannon of violating an 
oral order of August 27, 2015, which is not binding, and as such, she cannot do. He then lists 
visitation that he had with his sons on September 13, 2015, June 16, 2016, "regular" visits with 
the youngest, and three (3) visits with the older, which apparently stopped on September 25, 2016. 
He states he has not seen his daughter since March 2014. He also lists phone calls he made to the 
children that he says were not answered on June 29 and 30; July 2, 5, 6, 7, 12, 13, 28, and 30; 
August 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 30, and 31; September 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 21, 22, 
26 
26, 27, 28, 29, and 30; and October 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13. As no year is listed, 
it is presumed that these phone calls took place during 2016. He stated that he called the children's 
phone daily, "multiple times," until it was shut off. 
Paragraph 4 of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce concerns physical custody of the 
children. It states "Dawn is awarded sole physical custody of the parties' minor children RL V 
(born 2000), GN (born 2004), and NL V (born 2007). Ronald shall have custodial time with the 
children every second (2nd) and fourth (4th) weekend at his home in Homedale from Friday at 
6:00 p.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m .... The children may choose not to be with Ronald for his 
custodial time, and if any or all so choose( s ), then Ronald may not exercise his custodial time with 
that/those child/ren .... Ronald may have unlimited phone contact by texting, calling, or Skyping 
with the children, as the children choose, on a phone other than Dawn's, between the hours of 8:00 
a.m. and 8:00 p.m." By the terms of the Judgment, Cannon has no say in whether the children visit 
with their father, nor does she have any say in whether the children speak to him on the phone. 
The choice to do either, both, or neither is solely the decision of the children. By the very nature 
of the Judgment, Cannon CANNOT violate it concerning custody, and therefore cannot be found 
in contempt. This very argument was made in Cannon's objection to Van Hook's Motion, as well 
as in the hearing on his Motion. It was found to be persuasive, and Van Hook's Motion was denied. 
It should not be overturned on this Appeal. 
III. RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS WAS PROPERLY 
GRANTED 
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Attorney fees may be awarded in accordance with IRFLP 908 to the prevailing party in an 
action, as defined in IRFLP 901, and may also be awarded when the court finds, based upon the 
facts presented to it, that the proceeding was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously. IRFLP 
901.B allows for costs as a matter of right to the prevailing party. The determination of who is the 
prevailing party is left to the sound discretion of the trial court based upon the result of the action 
in relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. IRFLP 901.B. An award of attorney fees 
is committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge; and, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, 
the award will not be disturbed on appeal. DesFosses, 122 Idaho at 638 . (citing DesFosses, 120 
Idaho 27). As stated previously, the Appellate Court shall inquire as to (1) whether the trial court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the trial court acted within the outer 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason 
when determining whether a trial court abused its discretion. Sun Valley Shopping Center, 119 
Idaho at 94. 
Van Hook filed his Motion for Change Of and/or New Orders, Motion to Change Venue, 
Motion for Order Finding Defendant in Criminal Contempt and Notice, and Motion to Disqualify 
Judge with Cause, all without merit. He added a Motion for Reconsideration, which by its very 
nature could not be granted. The Motion for Order Finding Defendant in Criminal Contempt and 
Notice failed to cite incidents of contempt with the specificity required by IRCP 75. Additionally, 
there is no way Cannon can violate the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, and therefore, that Motion 
was denied as frivolous. As Cannon was the prevailing party, and the Motions were denied as 
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frivolous, attorney fees were properly awarded under IRFLP 901 and IRFLP 908. 
IV. THERE ARE NO NEW ISSUES RAISED IN APPELLANT'S APPEAL 
Van Hook attempts to relitigate the Divorce trial in this Appeal, as he did in his first Appeal, 
and as he has in every filing subsequent to September 9, 2015. In this appeal, he takes it up a notch 
by accusing Judge DeMeyer of waging war against the U.S. Constitution, and thereby committing 
Treason, which is a capital offense. There is no basis for this accusation, and it should not be 
allowed to be raised now in the furtherance another collateral attack on the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce. He accuses all attorneys involved in this case on both sides of perpetrating multiple 
frauds upon the Court because he does not understand court rules and procedure, but offers no 
evidence aside from tinfoil hat conspiracy theories. As such, these are not issues that should be 
considered in this appeal. Lastly, as stated in Paragraph I, augmenting the record does not open all 
of the previously closed cases, so they do not provide any additional issues for appeal. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS SHOULD BE A WARDED TO THE RESPONDENT 
AGAINST APPELLANT'S APPEAL 
Attorn~y fees and costs should be awarded to Cannon in accordance with IAR 40 and 41 
for having to defend this Appeal, as said Appeal is frivolous in that it brings only frivolous issues 
to the Court for review. It brings no meritorious issues to this Court for consideration, but only 
rehashes Van Hook's complaints about Judge DeMeyer in this case that have already been heard 
and ruled upon prior to this Appeal. Attorney fees are generally only awarded when the Court is 
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"left with the abiding belief that the appeal was brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, 
unreasonably or without foundation." Minich v. Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 911, 918 
(Idaho 1979). An appeal should do more than ask the appellate court to revisit the trial court's 
decision, and absent a clear showing of error or abuse of discretion, the appellate court will not do 
so. Krebs v. Krebs, 114 Idaho 571 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988). Unquestionably, this appeal was brought 
without foundation, and asked the appellate court for a re-do on every case that Van Hook has 
been involved in, dating back to 2012. This is beyond the scope of the appellate court, and is the 
very definition of frivolous. Attorney's fees and costs should be awarded to Cannon for having to 
defend this baseless, frivolous Appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Ronald L. Van Hook's Appeal must be denied as it presents only frivolous issues 
to this Court for review. Van Hook is extremely unhappy about various interlocutory rulings 
handed down by the magistrate judge during the court of the Divorce proceeding, as well as the 
final Judgment and Decree of Divorce, but rather than availing himself of the various remedies for 
his displeasure that exist under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (and later the Idaho Rules of 
Family Law Procedure), he missed the deadlines and has chosen to mount two separate collateral 
attacks on the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, first via a Motion to Recuse the Honorable Judge 
Gary D. DeMeyer with Cause, while there were no proceedings pending from which the judge 
could be recused, that resulted in an Appeal that he lost. And rather than appealing that loss to a 
higher court, he chose to file five (5) more frivolous motions, all of which were also dismissed as 
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frivolous. In attempting to relitigate the divorce trial via this method, his motions have been denied 
and found to be frivolous, resulting in attorney fees and costs being awarded. Nothing that has 
been presented in Van Hook's Appellant's Brief should disturb those decisions made well within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. Respondent Dawn R. Cannon respectfully requests that Van 
Hook's Appeal be denied, and attorney fees and costs be awarded to her for having to defend this 
frivolous Appeal. 
DATED this 19th day of October 2017. 
KIMBERLI A. STRETCH 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 20th day of October 2017. 
~al, Q~y~ WARY PUB IC FOR IDAH3 
Residing at: Ca Lk.u d. 
Commission Expires: ,;J/1'-l:j~od-~ 
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